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I. INTRODUCTION
"The bane of every budget director's existence is the rapid increase in
unfunded state and federal mandates."1 This statement reflects the widespread frustration felt by localities forced to comply with federal and state
legislation that imposes duties on them without providing funding. The
mandate era is thought to owe its existence to the Reagan/Bush administrations, whose aim was to lessen the federal government's responsibilities.'

* Professor Spyke is a Professor of Legal Writing at the Nova University Shepard Broad
Law Center, where she teaches Florida Constitutional Law. During the 1993-94 academic
year, she will be a Visiting Professor of Law at Duquesne Law School. She extends her
thanks and appreciation to Craig Glasser, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center 1994
J.D. candidate, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. John R. Blinn, When Cities Go Under, MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 1991, at 37.
2. William Tucker, Rebellion Grows Against Federal Mandates, PuB. FIN. WASH.
WATCH, Feb. 1, 1993, at 4.
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Congress, not sharing this view and eager to continue implementing social
policy, engaged in cost shifting by enacting laws that passed the cost of
program compliance along to state and local governments.
At a time when the staggering cost of federal mandates has placed
many a locality in a "financial straightjacket, ' ,4 state governments have only
added to the load by enacting their own cost shifting legislation. Florida
is no exception. Between the years of 1981 and 1990, Florida's Legislature
enacted 288 mandates, many of them unfunded.6 These mandates required
Florida's local governments to "manage growth, provide pension benefits,
protect the environment, and otherwise take action to address various
problems." 7 The 1988 state mandates alone were estimated to cost
Florida's local governments close to $39 million. 8 Responding to pressure
from local governments to curtail the flood of mandate legislation, the
Florida Legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution that
would restrict mandates. In 1990, the amendment received a favorable vote
of the electorate and became section 18 of article VII of the Florida
Constitution.9
Although the amendment's initial language excuses local governments
from complying with state mandates, 0 other provisions within the amendment contain numerous exceptions and exemptions," all the result of
predictable compromises. Taken together, these exceptions and exemptions
may not "swallow the rule," but they nevertheless take a few teeth out of
local government's intended goals of the provision. In the three years since
its enactment, the amendment appears to have had limited effect on
curtailing mandates. However, it has raised legislators' awareness of the
problem that results from unfunded mandates, has given local governments

3. Id.
4. Id. In early 1993, the date of Mr. Tucker's article, the annual cost of federal
mandates was estimated to be between $3 and $4 billion. Id.
5. See id.
6. Staffof Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Alf., CS/HJR 139, 140 (1989) Staff Analysis
2 (April 5, 1989) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter April 5 Staff Analysis].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18. Throughout this article the amendment will be
interchangeably referred to as "the amendment" and "section 18."
10. See infra text accompanying note 39.
11. "Exception" is used to refer to an item that is excused from the operation of the
amendment, while "exemption" refers to an item that falls outside the scope of the
amendment. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 559, 571 (6th ed. 1990). As will be shown,

this may well be a distinction without a difference.
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a stronger voice in the legislative process, and has helped local governments
maintain existing funding. To a limited extent, section 18 has fulfilled its
purpose, as expressed in the legislative history. 2 While local governments
feel section 18 has not gone far enough, they nevertheless welcome it, and
now see a need to push the Legislature to enact implementing legislation.
Reasonable implementing legislation, coupled with a new generation of
mandate-conscious legislators, should further help alleviate Florida's
intergovernmental frictions.

II.BACKGROUND
The amendment's legislative history exposes the extent of the mandate
problem that existed at the end of the 1980's. The seemingly non-stop
enactment of mandates by the Florida Legislature resulted in a deepening
crisis with no apparent end in sight.13 The problem had worsened despite
action taken in the previous decade. In 1977, as a partial response to the
taxpayers' revolt and the constitutional limitations on local governments'
revenue structure, the Legislature created the Florida Advisory Council on
Intergovemnental Relations (ACIR). 4
The legislative findings and
purpose underlying the creation of ACIR acknowledged a need to study
problems with the intergovernmental aspects of state finance and interstate
relationships. 5 ACIR was required to examine proposed state programs
and "assess their impact upon Florida and its political subdivisions . ".1..'6
ACIR was also required to issue annual reports of its findings and
recommendations, and analyze all new state programs or expansion of
existing programs that increased the expenditure or lessened the revenueproducing ability of local governments. 7
In 1978, legislation was passed requiring each bill that affected the
financial condition of local governments to include an economic impact

12. See infra text accompanying note 41.
13. See generallyKristinConroy Rubin, Unfunded Mandates: A ContinuingSource of
IntergovernmentalDiscord,17FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591,592 (1990) (discussing intergovernmental relations in Florida). In 1988, for example, the Legislature enacted legislation
expanding the number of people eligible to receive local government pension benefits. Id.
14. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.701-.708 (1991); see also April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6,
at 1.
15. FLA. STAT. § 163.702 (1991).
16. Id. § 163.705(1)(d).
17. Id. § 163.705(1)(g), (3).
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statement. 8 Accordingly, section 11.076 of the Florida Statutes reads as a
strong directive, not only requiring economic impact statements for all state
mandated legislation, but additionally requiring the state to provide funding
to offset certain mandated program costs.' 9 However, this facially helpful
legislation was largely ignored by subsequent legislatures, who were not
bound by the acts of their predecessors.2" Therefore, even though the
statute was not repealed, it provided no help to Florida counties and cities.
Statistics showed that the number of mandates was increasing. From
1981 to 1988, 288 mandates were enacted; forty-nine mandates were enacted
in 1987; sixty-five mandates were enacted in 1988. In 1988 alone, the
mandate price tag for local governments was $38,976,100.1 Despite the
escalation, the number of mandates was not out of proportion to the number
of general acts.2" However, the numbers alone did not reflect the full
extent of the problem. ACIR found, in its 1985 report, that bills including
mandates received less scrutiny by the Legislature than other legislation.23
Mandates were also enacted during the last three days of the legislative
session," 4 further indicating the decreased level of attention given them.
ACIR also found many of the bills did not set forth their cost to local
government. 5
The significance of the large number of mandates and the corresponding cost to local governments was heightened by existing constitutional
restrictions on local governments. Under the Florida Constitution, the state
has considerable control over local government. 26 Article VIII, section
1(a) of the constitution provides that counties can be "created, abolished or
changed by law .
,.
7 Similarly, Florida "municipalities may be
established or abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or
special law."2 8 Local governments have been given home rule power by

18. April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 1;see also FLA. STAT. § 11.076 (1991).
19. FLA. STAT. § 11.076 (1991).
20. Rubin, supra note 13, at 598; see also April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 2.
For the Legislature to be bound, the mandate restriction had to appear in the state's
constitution. Rubin, supra note 13, at 598.
21. April 5 Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 2.
22. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Afft, CS/CS/CS/CS/HJR 139, 140 (1989)
Staff Analysis 2 (final June 2,1989) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Final Staff Analysis].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 3.
26. FLA. CONST. art VIII, § I(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2(a).
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the Legislature,29 but the Legislature still retains discretionary power over
them."
This discretionary power allowed the Legislature to impose
mandates as it saw fit.
This unrestrained mandate situation posed particular problems in light
of limitations on local governments' revenue generating mechanisms. The
Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o tax shall be levied except in
pursuance of law."31 Further, while the state cannot levy ad valorem taxes
on real property, all other forms of taxation are preempted to the state unless
otherwise provided by law.32 Local governments are left to rely primarily
on ad valorem taxes, service charges, and state-shared revenues for their
funding33 within the limits of the constitution.34 Although counties and
cities may have other lesser revenue sources, including utility service taxes
and local option taxes, the state determines the extent of their taxing authori35
ty.
Against this bleak fiscal backdrop, the 1989 Florida Legislature
addressed the mandate problem. Relying on the 1985 ACIR Report, the
Legislature considered five methods to address unfunded mandates: 1) a
reimbursement program, requiring local governments to be paid for certain
mandates; 2) a sunset provision, requiring local mandates to expire within
a set time frame unless re-enacted; 3) a sunrise provision, requiring an
extraordinary majority vote to enact unfunded mandates; 4) a monitoring
mechanism, to identify and monitor mandate bills during the legislative
process; and. 5) a fiscal note protocol, to determine the impact of mandate
legislation.3" The final version of the amendment embraces, to an extent,
all the alternatives except the sunset provision. An earlier proposal included
both the sunset and sunrise alternatives, but gave way in committee to the
provisions that were ultimately submitted to the voters. 3' The final joint
resolution, replete with exemptions and special provisions, was finally
adopted in 1990. However, it was not readily accepted by the Legislature.

29. County and municipal home rule is authorized by chapters 125 and 166 of the
Florida Statutes, respectively. Id.
30. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 2; see also City of Boca Raton v. State, 595
So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992).
31. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § I(a).
32. Id.
33. Rubin, supra note 13, at 594.
34. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) (amended 1976) (limiting the millage rate for
ad valorem taxation at the county and municipal level).
35. Rubin, supra note 13, at 594.
36. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 3.
37. Rubin, supra note 13, at 603-06.
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A separate initiative petition that would have placed before the voters an
amendment prohibiting local mandates altogether unless they were funded,
proved to be the catalyst for legislative approval.38

III. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18
The mandate restriction amendment is composed of five subsections:
subsection (a) sets forth the limitation on laws requiring local governments
to spend money and provides for exceptions that will allow their passage;
subsection (b) sets forth limits on laws that reduce local government
authority to raise revenues; subsection (c) limits legislation that would
reduce local governments' share of state taxes; subsection (d) sets forth the
laws that are exempt from the first three subsections; and subsection (e)
provides that the Legislature may enact implementing legislation.39 For the

38. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Approp., tape recording ofproceedings (May 22, 1989) (on file
with author) (comments of Rep. Bloom).
39. The amendment in its entirety reads as follows:
SECTION 18. Laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend funds or
limiting their ability to raise revenue or receive state tax revenue.(a) No county or municipality shall be bound by any general law
requiring such county or municipality to spend funds or to take an action
requiring the expenditure of funds unless the legislature has determined that such
law fulfills an important state interest and unless: funds have been appropriated
that have been estimated at the time of enactment to be sufficient to fund such
expenditure; the legislature authorizes or has authorized a county or municipality
to enact a funding source not available for such county or municipality on
February 1, 1989, that can be used to generate the amount of funds estimated to
be sufficient to fund such expenditure by a simple majority vote of the
governing body of such county or municipality; the law requiring such
expenditure is approved by two-thirds of the membership in each house of the
legislature; the expenditure is required to comply with a law that applies to all
persons similarly situated, including the state and local governments; or the law
is either required to comply with a federal requirement or required for eligibility
for a federal entitlement, which federal requirement specifically contemplates
actions by counties or municipalities for compliance.
(b) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by two-thirds
of the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or repeal any general
law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to reduce the authority that
municipalities or counties have to raise revenues in the aggregate, as such
authority exists on February 1, 1989.
(c) Except upon approval of each house of the legislature by two-thirds
of the membership, the legislature may not enact, amend, or repeal any general
law if the anticipated effect of doing so would be to reduce the percentage of a
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sake of clarity, this article's use of the word "exception" refers to those
mandates allowed under subsection (a), and "exemption" refers to the laws
that escape the reach of section 18, as listed in subsection (d). 4"
The Legislature's Final Staff Analysis for section 18 clearly sets forth
its intent: 'The intent of this proposed constitutional provision is to give
local governments greater bargaining power on the subject of unfunded
mandates and to protect existing local revenue sources."4 Earlier versions
of the proposed amendment were thought to go much further than the stated
intent, and much of the language in the adopted amendment was aimed at
preserving that intent.42 This statement of intent is more restrictive than
one which would indicate an intent to curtail unfunded mandates, which is
what local governments likely desired.
Perhaps the statement of legislative purpose represents the greatest of
all the compromises between local governments and the Legislature. It
indicates that the Legislature was willing to present an amendment that
would give local governments more of a voice in the legislative mandate
process and assist them in maintaining funding. The Legislature recognized
the amendment would "affect the legislature's ability to create, reorganize,
and abolish programs" and "encourage greater cooperation between ... all

state tax shared with counties and municipalities as an aggregate on February 1,
1989. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to enhancements enacted
after February 1, 1989, to state tax sources, or during a fiscal emergency
declared in a written joint proclamation issued by the president of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives, or where the legislature provides
additional state-shared revenues which are anticipated to be sufficient to replace
the anticipated aggregate loss of state-shared revenues resulting from the
reduction of the percentage of the state tax shared with counties and municipalities, which source of replacement revenues shall be subject to the same
requirements for repeal or modification as provided herein for a state-shared tax
source existing on February 1, 1989.
(d) Laws adopted to require funding of pension benefits existing on the
effective date of this section, criminal laws, election laws, the general appropriations act, special appropriations acts, laws reauthorizing but not expanding thenexisting statutory authority, laws having insignificant fiscal impact, and laws
creating, modifying, or repealing noncriminal infractions, are exempt from the
requirements of this section.
(e) The legislature may enact laws to assist in the implementation and
enforcement of this section.
FLA. CONST, art. VII, § 18.
40. This follows legislative staff practice. See also supra note 11.
41. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 9.
42. Id. at 9-10.
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levels of government" 43 But nowhere does the legislative history indicate
that the Legislature viewed the amendment as one that would significantly
curtail its policy-implementing activity.44 This point is important in
assessing the success of section 18. A discussion of how the amendment
was crafted to reflect that intent follows.
Subsection (a) deals with spending mandates, or those mandates that
require local governments to spend money. Under its provisions, neither
counties nor municipalities are bound by general laws that require them to
spend funds unless the Legislature first determines that the law fulfills an
important state interest.45 In addition, the law must meet one of five
requirements: the Legislature must appropriate funds for the mandate based
on the estimated cost at the time of enactment; the Legislature must
authorize the local government to enact a funding source to cover the
estimated cost of the mandate; the mandate must be approved by two-thirds
of the membership in each house of the Legislature; the mandate must be
part of a law that applies to all persons similarly situated, including state and
local governments; or the mandate must be necessary to comply with a
federal requirement that contemplates local government involvement.4 6
The subsection sets out a two-part test that must be met by mandates that
require local government expenditures. All such mandates must fulfill an
important state interest, and must additionally meet one of the five tests
outlined above.4'
Under this subsection, only local governments are given standing to
challenge a mandate, and they are not further required to bring an action
unless the State challenges them for noncompliance.48 The limitation on
standing prevents the courts from being otherwise flooded with challenges
to general laws,49 which was one of the concerns with earlier proposals."0
It is both interesting, and perhaps significant, that the amendment does not
begin with language expressly restricting the Legislature, such as, "Notwithstanding any other provision herein, the legislature shall not enact any law
...." Instead, the provision begins by stating that local governments are

43. Id.
44. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 5. Local governments are free to bring a
declaratory judgment action as well. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10.
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not bound by certain types of general laws.5 The latter language reads
less as a restriction on the Legislature than a right of local governments.
Further, the wording of the provision could be read to place the burden on
local governments to prove a mandate fails to comply with section
18, as
52
opposed to having the Legislature prove a law passes muster.
The legislative history makes clear that the first prong of the spending
mandate's provision, requiring an important state interest, is to be based on
a purely legislative determination, not on fact finding.53 In practice, this
prong has proved to be easily met and is seen as weakening the amendment.54 How the courts will deal with "important state interest" when
confronted with a challenge is unclear." It is likely, however, that courts
will tend to defer to the legislative determination.56
The alternative second prongs to the test in subsection (a) were also the
subject of compromise. An earlier proposal was read to prohibit the
Legislature, without a two-thirds membership vote, from passing laws
pursuant to its police power if the laws affected local government. In
response, the amendment's exception for laws that apply to "all persons
similarly situated, including the state and local governments" was added.57
This provision, if interpreted liberally, could allow numerous mandates to
be enacted; indeed, it can be said that most laws apply to all similarly
situated persons and entities." Local governments view this provision as
a troublesome loophole. 9
There was also concern under an earlier amendment proposal that
legislation could be invalidated even if funding was provided in separate
legislation." The staff analysis notes that the amendment, as adopted,
allows the Legislature to appropriate funds without necessarily tying them

51. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 18(a).
52. But see Telephone Interview with Lym Tipton, Executive Assistantfor Intergovernmental Relations, Florida League of Cities (May 26, 1993).
53. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 5.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 195, 205.
55. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
56. Florida courts have been extremely deferential to the Legislature in analogous
situations. See, e.g., Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)
(the Legislature's determination of public purpose must be clearly wrong to be beyond the
power of the Legislature).
57. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10.
58. Laws failing to treat those similarly situated in the same manner may raise equal
protection questions.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
60. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10.
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to the mandate.6 1 Another feared problem was that local governments
might later challenge funded mandates, claiming that the funding was
inadequate. In response, the amendment reflects that a funded mandate will
qualify as an exception under subsection (a) as long as the sufficiency of
funding is reasonable at the time of enactment.6 2 As such, there should be
no danger of later rehearings.6" Further, while prior proposals would have
prohibited mandates that were enacted in response to federal mandates, or
those enacted to enable the state to be eligible for federal entitlements, the
final language in subsection (a) provided exceptions to avoid these
results.6 4
One perceived ambiguity was not remedied before the amendment was
adopted. Subsection (a)'s focus on laws "requiring . .. [a] county or
municipality to spend funds""5 could refer to laws that both directly and
indirectly require local governments to spend money. This ambiguity may
lead to challenges brought against laws, the indirect effects of which require
the expenditure of funds. The legislative history acknowledges the
ambiguity, and notes that the phrase will likely be subject to later interpretation. 66
Much of the language in subsection (a) was tailored to keep the focus
of the amendment limited to.its purpose of giving local governments more
bargaining power in the Legislature and helping them maintain current
funding levels.67 The history also reveals that many of subsection (a)'s
provisions were added to preserve legislative autonomy. 68 Language in the
following subsections was similarly designed with that purpose in mind.
Subsection (b)'s aim is to prevent the Legislature from reducing the
revenue sources available to local governments in the aggregate.69
Similarly, subsection (c) prevents the Legislature from passing laws that
reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties and municipalities

61. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 10. The staff analysis suggests that the
Legislature designate the use of the funds, however. Id.
62. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 18(a); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 12.
63. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 12.
64. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(a).
65. Id.
66. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
67. Id. at 9.
68. See generally id.
69. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(b); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 4 (this
provision is tied to aggregate revenue sources as of February 1, 1989).
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as an aggregate." Under both subsections, a vote of two-thirds of the
membership of the Legislature is required for any such legislation to be
valid." The language specifically looks to the "anticipated" effect of
legislation, making clear that the effect will be determined at the time of
enactment.72 This language, as in the case of subsection (a)'s funding
provision, seeks to limit future challenges based on inaccurate predictions .
The use of the word "aggregate" is also significant, since it "clarifies
that estimates will be made on the basis of the effect on all local governments grouped together, not on the basis of the effect on one municipality
or county."7 ' The existing language appears to allow the passage of laws
that would decrease either the revenue raising authority or state-shared
revenues in a small number of counties, while at the same time increasing
funds in others. As long as the aggregate revenue-raising authority or the
percentage of state-shared tax revenues remained the same under the law,
the law would be permissible with a simple majority vote.7" Only if the
law reduced the aggregate revenue raising authority or state revenue sharing
percentage would a two-thirds vote be required.76
Earlier versions of the amendment had raised concerns that the
Legislature could be prevented from restructuring local government funding
and duties, even where the net result would be a zero decrease in funds.77
Accordingly:, the language in subsections (b) and (c) makes it clear that
existing local government revenue sources and state-shared funds are not
sacred; it is only the aggregate funds that are to be preserved." It is
interesting that the final staff analysis for the joint resolution notes that a
two-thirds vote "would allow any restructuring."7 9 This language suggests
that a super-majority vote would be needed to enact a law restructuring local
government revenue sharing, even where the net effect was zero. As
discussed above, a literal reading of the amendment's language suggests that
such a law would not be considered a mandate under the amendment. It is
70. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c); see also Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 4
(February 1, 1989, is also the pertinent date for this provision).
71. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 18(a), 18(c).
72. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 11.
75. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c).
76. See id.
77. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 11.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 11.
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also noteworthy that subsection (c) places limits only on those laws reducing
the percentage, rather than the amount, of state tax shared with local
governments. Therefore, the Legislature is arguably free to pass laws
liberalizing state tax exemptions that would reduce revenues, but that would
keep existing percentages intact. 80
Subsection (c) additionally includes a number of exceptions which
permit the enactment of laws reducing state-shared tax revenues without a
two-thirds vote.8" These exceptions include, but are not limited to, laws
enacted during a fiscal emergency, and situations "where the legislature
provides additional state-shared revenues which are anticipated to be
sufficient to replace the anticipated aggregate loss of state-shared revenues."82
To pass a provision under either subsection (b) or (c), a two-thirds vote
is required. 83 The two-thirds vote is based on the membership of both
houses, rather than being based on those voting. 84 Since the Florida Senate
has forty members and the House has 120 members, votes of twenty-seven
and eighty would be required to meet the two-thirds vote in each house,
respectively. Although this may seem to be a difficult hurdle to overcome,
such a super-majority vote is not uncommon. 5
Yet another indication of compromise can be seen in subsection (d),
which lists those laws that are exempt from the amendment's requirements.
Exempt laws include those requiring "funding of pension benefits . . .
criminal laws, election laws, the general appropriations act, special
appropriations acts, laws reauthorizing but not expanding . . . existing
statutory authority, laws having insignificant fiscal impact, and laws
creating, modifying, or repealing noncriminal infractions . . ."" Under
an earlier proposal it appeared that the mandate restrictions could prevent
the passage of appropriations acts," which accounts for its inclusion as an
exemption.
Legislators additionally felt that the amendment needed a dollar
threshold to trigger the mandate restrictions, without which lawsuits would
".

80. See id. However, 1992 legislation provided for several sales tax exemptions and
gave the Legislature full mandate review. They were generally determined to be exempt
under the "insignificant fiscal impact" exemption. See infra text accompanying note 150.
81. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(c).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 7.
85. See infra text accompanying note 213.
86. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(d).

87. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 13.
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flourish. 8 Accordingly, the "insignificant fiscal impact" exemption was
included, which lessened the load on legislative staff, since it removed the
requirement of preparing fiscal analyses on bills with low price tags.8 9 The
exemption for laws having an insignificant impact could also prevent general
laws coming; within the provisions of the amendment if they have only an
indirect effect on local government funding. 9 This exemption has been
relied upon to enact numerous mandates, due largely in part to the
Legislature's calculation of insignificant fiscal impact.91
Finally,, subsection (e) allows the Legislature to enact implementing
legislation.9 2 This provision allows the Legislature to define pertinent
terms of the amendment, and also allows statutes to set venue for a
challenge under the amendment.93 Terms that would hopefully be defined
in such legislation include "insignificant fiscal impact" and "criminal laws."
When read against the background of intense anti-mandate sentiment
existing at the end of the 1980's, section 18 appears to be a weapon that
was largely dismantled by its own provisions. Local government's intended
purpose of the amendment would have simply been to stop unfunded state
mandates. However, the amendment must be read in light of its limited
legislative purpose of protecting existing local government revenues and
giving localities greater bargaining power in the Legislature.94 Bearing that
intent in mind, the amendment, on its face, appears useful. However, a
review of legislative activity in the sessions following the amendment's
adoption, as well as consideration of the current perceptions of counties and
cities, indicates that the amendment does not fully succeed, even based on
its restricted purposes.

IV. ACIR's RESPONSE
In fulfilling its statutory duties pursuant to section 163.705(3) of the
Florida Statutes, ACIR prepared a detailed report in 1991 to inform the
Governor and the Legislature about the status of the state mandates imposed

88. Id. at 10-11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 11. Laws can indirectly impact local governments by causing them to spend
money to promulgate ordinances, or by causing them to use outside counsel more often. Id.
But see supra text accompanying note 66.
91. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
92. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(e).
93. Final Staff Analysis, supra note 22, at 7.
94. Id. at 9.
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on Florida's local governments in the 1991 legislative session.95 This
report was supplemented in both 1992 and 1993 to provide information
about the state mandates imposed by the Legislature in those years.96
These reports provide valuable and comprehensive information regarding
mandate legislation passed since the adoption of section 18."
After
initially suggesting a decrease in mandate activity, the reports reveal that
mandate legislation has continued to be enacted, much of it falling within
the amendment's exceptions and exemptions.98
For the purposes of its reporting activities, ACIR has defined "mandate" to comply with the definition it sees as implicit in section 18." This
includes laws that, previous to the amendment's passage, would not have
been considered mandates, such as laws that applied proportionately to both
the private and public sector,1"' laws applicable to a single jurisdiction,
and laws that were optional or impacted non-mandated responsibilities.10 '
Mandate reporting under section 18 has led ACIR to be more inclusive in
the laws it examines. It may be, however, that legislative staff occasionally
interprets "mandate" differently. This is evidenced by laws that appear as
mandates in ACIR's post-1990 reports that were never given mandate
consideration by legislative staff.0 2
To further help legislative staff make its determinations under the
amendment, ACIR has established the ACIR/Local Government Facsimile
Network, which allows local governments to provide input regarding
mandate legislation. 3 Known as FAXNET, this tool enables ACIR to
contact thirty-eight counties and fifty-five cities to acquire reliable
information regarding proposed mandate legislation. 4 Legislative staff,

95. FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1991 REPORT
ON MANDATES AND MEASURES AFFECTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL CAPACITY, Sept.

1991, 91-3, at i. [hereinafter 1991 REPORT] (providing a fairly detailed background of the
mandate problem, and also devoting a section to mandate restrictions and reimbursement
programs in other states).
96. FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1992
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1991 REPORT ON MANDATES AND MEASURES AFFECTING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FISCAL CAPACITY, Oct. 1992, at 3. [hereinafter 1992 REPORT].
97. See generally id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Here, ACIR uses the example of Workers' Compensation benefits. Id. at 5.
101. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 5.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
103. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 28.
104. Id.
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local government officials, and ACIR personnel may initiate a FAXNET
transmission, to which local governments typically respond within fortyeight hours.105

V. LEGISLATIVE STAFF PROCEDURES
The leadership of the 1991 House and Senate developed policies to
review proposed legislation for mandate issues. The ACIR Report describes
the early activity as follows:
Substantive committee staff were charged to provide initial review of
proposed legislation for mandates on counties and municipalities. Each
chamber designated a committee or ad hoc group to assist committee
staff in screening pre-filed bills. These same entities were responsible
to monitor [sic] amended bills for mandates. In the Senate, the
Committee on Community Affairs assumed this task, with assistance
from the Finance, Taxation, and Claims Committee and staff from the
Executive Office of the Senate. In the House of Representatives, the
Finance & Taxation and Appropriations Committees, together with staff
from the Speaker's Office, were given this responsibility." 6
Fiscal notes are prepared by staff members of those committees
considering the legislation. Depending on the status of the legislation under
section 18, the Speaker or the Senate President is notified so that the proper
action can be taken on the bill. 7
It was also important to the Legislature that staff members uniformly
interpret the provisions of the amendment. In response to that concern, a
"3-8-3: Local Mandate Analysis Procedure" was developed.'
The
procedure institutes a flow-chart approach to be used with proposed
legislation.')
Under this approach, each bill is initially reviewed to
determine if it can be classified as one of three types of bills: 1) a general
bill requiring local governments to spend money or take action requiring the
expenditure of money; 2) a general bill anticipated to reduce local government authority to raise aggregate revenue; or 3) a general bill reducing the
aggregate local government percentage share of state-shared revenue. If the

105. Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 22.
Id.
1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 22-24.
Id. at 23.
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bill can be classified as one of these three types of bills, staff must then
determine if any of subsection (d)'s eight exemptions apply. The exemptions include: bills funding previous pension benefits, criminal laws,
election laws, general appropriations bills, special appropriations bills, bills
re-authorizing existing statutory authority, bills having insignificant fiscal
impact, and bills establishing non-criminal infractions. If any one of the
eight exemptions apply, the bill is deemed exempt.11 °
Any bill that cannot be classified as exempt must meet requirements
that depend on which of the three original classifications apply. If the bill
requires the expenditure of money by local governments, the Legislature
must formally determine the bill serves an important state interest, and
additionally, one of four requirements must be met: 1) estimated funding
must be provided; 2) a local funding source must be provided; 3) the bill
must require compliance by similarly situated persons; or 4) the bill must
be required to comply with a federal mandate. If none of these exceptions
apply, the bill must receive a vote of two-thirds of the membership of each
house in addition to serving an important state interest.)
If the bill reduces the fund raising authority of local governments, there
are no substantive exceptions, and the bill must pass with the two-thirds
super-majority vote. If the bill reduces local governments' percentage share
of state-shared revenues, the bill can be excepted from the mandate
restrictions if it provides for enhancements to state tax sources, if there is
a proclaimed state fiscal emergency, or if a revenue replacement source is
included in the bill. If none of these exceptions apply, a two-thirds vote is
required. "2
The "3-8-3" legislative approach reformats the amendment's provisions
into a uniform paradigm for staff members. Bills are first considered to see
if they fall within one of the three types of mandates; they are then
considered to determine if they fall within one of the eight exemptions to
the amendment; if not, the three mandate classifications are then reconsidered to ensure compliance under the amendment.
Legislative guidelines from the 1991 session also reveal the Legislature's interpretation of some of the amendment's terms. For example,
exempt criminal laws are interpreted by the guidelines to include laws that
define the type of behavior that will subject persons to arrest and criminal3
sanction, as well as laws related to arrest and pre-trial detention."
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id.

113. 1991

REPORT,

supra note 95, at 24.
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Additionally, laws will be considered exempt under the criminal law
exemption if they relate to defense and prosecution or deal with adjudication, sentencing, and implementation of criminal sanctions. 1 4 "Insignificant fiscal impact" was defined to be any amount less than $1.4 million for
1991-92, an amount equal to ten cents or less per capita per year.'
Staff analyses, the uniform legislative history document in Florida, now
devote an entire section to municipal and county mandate restrictions. The
section typically appears as Section III, following the Bill Summary (Section
I), and the Economic Impact and Fiscal Note section (Section 11).116 Staff
first identifies whether the bill under analysis will require the expenditure
of funds by local governments, and then addresses whether any exemptions
or exceptions apply. If an accurate measure of costs to local governments
cannot be determined, the notes will explain which other exemptions or
exceptions may be applicable." 7

VI. THE 1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
During the 1991 legislative session, fourteen mandate bills were

114. Id. This has been interpreted liberally by legislative staff in at least one instance.
See infra text accompanying note 151.
115. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
116. Miscellaneous staff analyses in author's files.
117. By way of example, the following appears under the Mandates Restrictions section
in a 1993 Staff Analysis for a bill aimed at streamlining the environmental permitting
process:
As noted above, affected counties and municipalities will incur costs related to
reviewing applications to determine consistency with local comprehensive plans
and land use regulations. While the act provides for reimbursement of such
costs to affected reviewing agencies, such reimbursement funds must be shared
with state and regional agencies involved in the review process. If there are
insufficient funds to completely reimburse all reviewing agencies, the funds are
prorated. Thus, there may be instance in which counties and municipalities will
be required to expend funds (for which reimbursement would not be provided)
in order to comply with this act. Because the amount of any such reimbursed
costs canot readily be determined at this time, the bill may need to include a
finding of important state interest and be enacted by a vote of 2/3 of the
membership of each house in order to comply with article VII, section 18 (a),
Florida Constitution.
Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., CS/CS/SB 1606 (1993) Staff Analysis 5-6 (March
16, 1993) (on file with comm.).
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enacted."' Most of the mandates (eleven of the fourteen bills) required
local governments to either create new services or expand existing ones.
The balance of the bills reduced the revenue-generating authority of local'
governments.119 The mandate total represented a sharp decrease in the
mandate levels of the immediately preceding years. 20 Interestingly, all of
the fourteen mandates were determined to be either exempt under subsection
(d) of section 18, or excepted under subsection (a)."'
Thirteen of the fourteen mandate bills were exempt because they were
determined to have an insignificant fiscal impact. 22 Those mandates
touched on many areas, demonstrating the far reach of section 18. The laws
dealt with many subjects, including building permits, taxation, transportation
corridors, community development, and health care. In the area of health
care, a law was passed increasing the Medicaid reimbursement for out-ofcounty indigent medical expenses from 80 to 100 percent. A community
development law was passed that expanded the information required on the
annual reports of local governments with enterprise zones. 1 23 A law
expanding the notice statement on building permits was also included as a
mandate.1 24 Those mandates that represented revenue reduction measures
included a law that broadened the classification of educational property for
the purposes of an ad valorem tax exemption. Another law established a
maximum amount for the total charges and fees that could be imposed on
a party who initiates civil or appellate proceedings in circuit and county
25

courts. 1

The fourteenth bill passed in response to a federal requirement, and
thus enjoyed an exception under the amendment. This bill required the
Department of Community Affairs to ensure that energy assessments are
conducted before a residence is weatherized." 6 Since this bill qualified
for an exception under subsection (a), it also required a finding that it would
fulfill an important state interest. However, the ACIR Report is silent as to

118. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 31.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 27.
121. Id. at 31. The ACIR 1991 Report notes that the 1991 session also resulted in the
passage of revenue generating legislation which, to some extent, helped offset the impact of
the new mandates. Id.
122. 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 32-34.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 32.
125. Id. at 32-33.
126. Id. at 33.
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whether that finding was ever made. 1
The 1991 Legislature also passed a number of bills expanding local
government revenue sources. While a number of these bills were deemed
to have an insignificant impact on the state, other programs represented
substantial funds for local governments. One bill amended the sales tax
statute to authorize an additional $5.5 million in sales tax revenue for cities
and counties.1 28 Additional sales tax revenue was authorized for those
local governments with professional sports facilities or new spring training
facilities. 29 Laws also allocated funds to local governments to help them
prepare their comprehensive plans. 3 °
The 1991 mandate legislation demonstrates how broadly section 18
touches on the legislative process. For example, one might be surprised to
find that bills dealing with the notice provisions of building permits would
require review under the amendment. The same might also be said of the
law requiring additional information on local government annual reports.
The seemingly innocuous laws that were tracked by legislative staff,
suggests that the Legislature had a heightened awareness of the cost of laws
as they were considered, even though virtually all of the laws passed
because their fiscal impact was determined to be insignificant.
ACIR's 1991 Report also provides a list of selected mandates that were
not passed in that session. While one might think that their failure was due
to the cost of the measures, some of the ill-fated mandates had been
previously determined to be excepted by the "all persons similarly situated"
A look at those bills is telling. One
language in the amendment.13
proposed bill deemed to affect all persons similarly situated dealt with
eminent domain, requiring governments to pay cash compensation to
billboard owners for the removal of billboards in certain situations. 32
Another proposed bill thought to qualify for the "similarly situated"
exception, granted law enforcement employees the same disability benefits
as fire fighters.' 33 The bills would have unquestionably required local
governments to spend significant amounts of money. The bills' broad-based
police power character, however, would have allowed their passage under
section 18, as long as they were also found to fulfill important state

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 38.

133. Id.
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interests.

B. Implementing Legislation
Pursuant to subsection (e) of the amendment, the 1991 Legislature
passed implementing legislation that was vetoed by Governor Chiles." 4
The bill gave direction to any city or county choosing not to comply with
a law that was allegedly violative of the amendment, and further established
venue for such a challenge. The bill also defined "insignificant fiscal
impact."
Under the bill, known as Senate Bill 2000,3' a local government that
refused to comply with mandate legislation first had to pass an ordinance
declaring that the mandate violated article VII, section 18, and that the local
government was not bound by the mandate.136 Within ten days, a certified
copy of the ordinance was to be filed with the Secretary of State, who
would immediately notify the Governor, the Attorney General, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. 3 ' Within thirty days after
receiving notice of the ordinance, the Attorney General would file a petition
for a writ of mandamus to compel the local government's compliance with
the law; however, if the Attorney General determined that the law on its
face failed to meet the amendment's requirements, he or she could decide
not to file the petition for mandamus, and would then have to notify the
Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House, of that
decision. 3 ' Venue for the action was placed in the county in which the
district court of appeal, having jurisdiction over the county or municipality,
was located. All appeals were to be at the First District Court of Appeal.'
Finally, the implementing legislation defined "insignificant fiscal
impact" similarly to the definition in the Legislature's guidelines: "an
amount not greater than the product of the average statewide population for
the applicable state fiscal year ...

multiplied by ten cents."' 4 °

The Governor found a number of problems with the bill and addressed
them in his veto message. First, he underscored the intent of the mandate
amendment which, in his view, was "to discourage the Legislature's
134. Governor's Veto Message of S.B. 2000, reprintedin 2 FLA. S. JoUR. 10 (Spec.
Sess. C 1991); see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
135. S.B. 2000, reprintedin I FLA. S. JOUR. 132 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
136. Id.; see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 26.
137. Fla. SB 2000 (1991).

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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historical practice of reaping the benefit derived from enacting politically
popular programs without facing the responsibility of funding the pro'
grams."141
The amendment, therefore, represents a strong restriction on
the Legislature's authority to pass mandates, and should not be interpreted
to frustrate the will of the electorate, who had passed the amendment by a
wide margin.142 It is notable that the governor's opinion of section 18's
purpose is more expansive and local government-friendly than the stated
purpose of the amendment.
The veto message singled out a number of the bill's provisions. For
example, the Legislature's definition of "insignificant fiscal impact," an
amount not greater than $1.4 million, seemed too high, especially when
compared to the amount used in the parallel provision applicable to the
general appropriations process. That provision defines "insignificant fiscal
impact" as an amount not greater than $50,000.1'4 The Governor was also
concerned that the legislation placed an enormous burden on any local
government that chose to challenge a mandate, since it was required to pass
an ordinance and notify the Attorney General of its decision. Further, since
the Attorney General was given very little discretion in deciding whether to
seek mandamus, the legislation, in effect, forced local governments to spend
"sorely needed" revenues to fund mandate challenges. 44 Governor Chiles
suggested that ACIR become involved in the implementing legislation
process, since it was charged to deal with intergovernmental relations. 45
The Governor's veto put an end to Senate Bill 2000, and, in the intervening
two legislative sessions, there has been no proposal for implementing
legislation that has proceeded past the committee hearing stage.

VII. THE 1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
The number of legislative enactments increased dramatically in
1992. Thirty-two laws, including fifty-two local government mandates,

141.
C 1991);
142.
143.
144.
145.

Governor's Veto Message of SB 2000, reprintedin2 FLA. S.
see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were enacted.146 Of those laws, many were either exempt from the
requirements of section 18 or enjoyed one of the exceptions.147 Most of
the laws were found either to have an insignificant fiscal impact, or met the
"important state interest" test and were also funded, affected all persons
similarly situated, or passed by the needed two-thirds vote. 4 '
Laws determined to be exempt because of their insignificant fiscal
impact included, among others, laws increasing emergency medical service
license and certificate fees, and laws requiring simultaneous implementation
of Unemployment Compensation Law amendments. 49 Other laws that
passed by virtue of the insignificant fiscal impact exemption provided sales
tax exemptions. For example, laws were passed exempting non-profit
organizations from paying sales tax on equipment for pollution discharge
cleanup; exempting educational institutions from paying sales tax on works
of art; exempting the purchase of feed for ostriches from the sales tax;
exempting out-of-state publishers from sales and corporate income taxes in
certain situations; exempting Coast Guard auxiliary purchases from the sales
tax; and exempting non-profit community cemetery purchases from the sales
tax."15 The laws were identified as reducing the tax base or the sales tax
itself While not clear, the staff apparently felt that the laws represented
potential mandate problems under subsection (c), the provision limiting
mandates that "reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties and
municipalities as an aggregate . . . ." However, these sales tax exemptions
arguably decreased only the total amount of sales tax collected and did not
alter the percentage share of the state tax revenue. If this is so, these laws
were not mandates. Nevertheless, they were treated as such by legislative
staff.
One law enjoyed the criminal law exemption; it imposed a new
administrative requirement on law enforcement agencies that seize property
under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. It also provided for penalties
" ' Legislative staff determined this law qualified for
for noncompliance. 15
the criminal law exemption, despite the fact that it was described as an
administrative provision.
A number of the 1992 bills enjoyed exceptions under the amendment
after first being found to fulfill important state interests. Only one was

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8, 10.
Id. at 9-10.
1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 9-10.
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excepted because offsetting fees were authorized. That law created a new
service that required requiring that federal liens on real property to be filed
with the circuit courts rather than the federal district courts."5 2 Another
law removed a statutory prohibition against including salary incentive pay
in the calculation of police retirement benefits. 53 It passed by a twothirds vote. 5 4 The subject of a third law, declared to deal with an
important state interest, was "potty parity."1' 5 Under its provisions, newly
constructed public or private buildings with public rest rooms must provide
a specified ratio of water closets and urinals. This law passed muster since
it affected all persons similarly situated. 56
The 1992 Report is less enlightening in its treatment of a number of
other mandates. Eight of the laws enacted during that session were found
to raise mandate concerns but were amended in the House or Senate
chamber, so there was no accessible documentation as to the applicability
of section 18.157 Fourteen laws were found to contain mandate provisions
under the ACIR definition, 5 8 but the legislative staff failed to conclusively
address the problem in the staff analysis. In ACIR's opinion, this could
mean that the staff felt either an exemption or exception applied; alternatively, staff may have determined that section 18 was inapplicable. 5 9 This
could indicate a discrepancy between ACIR's mandate definition and that
used by legislative staff.
As in the case of the 1991 session, the 1992 session enacted various
laws that provided new or expanded revenue sources for local governments.
The fiscal impact of the vast majority of these provisions could not be
determined. 6 " However, a law increasing the cost of documentary stamps
translated into an additional $18.8 million for cities and counties.161
However, these funds were earmarked for state and local affordable housing
programs"' rather than being freely available to local governments. A
law that implemented a state-wide tax amnesty program was determined to

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 8.
1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8.
Id. at 8-11.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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yield local governments $3 million in 1992-93 and $8.1 million in 199394.163
A law imposing additional fees for child support payments was
determined to benefit county clerks of court in the amount of $1.1
million.' 6 4 Again, even though ACIR describes this law as one generating
extra funds for local governments, the new revenue would only benefit
clerks of court, rather than local governments in general. 6 '
Local governments were also given some leeway in how they handle
financial matters. Specifically, laws were passed allowing local governments to use certain tax revenues for expanded purposes.' 66 For example,
tourist development tax revenues were authorized to be used for museums.'67 Small counties were aided by a law allowing them to use local
government infrastructure surtax revenues for operating purposes.' 68 New
legislation also authorized small counties to use the local option gas tax on
69
motor and special fuel to pay for infrastructure projects.
B. Implementing Legislation
In response to Governor Chiles' veto of the 1991 implementing
legislation, the House of Representatives Finance and Taxation Committee
sought input from local government representatives and again introduced
similar legislation. 7
Although not enacted into law, the proposed legislation is interesting
in how it differed from the 1991 attempt. Once again, the bill required a
local government to document its determination that a mandate failed to
meet the requirements of section 18 and, therefore, the county or city was
not bound by the law. The Attorney General, as in the case of the earlier
bill, was given the opportunity to seek a writ of mandamus, and venue was
set in the circuit court having jurisdiction over the county or municipality.'
The 1992 attempt differed most significantly from the 1991 version
in its definition of "insignificant fiscal impact." The 1992 bill contained

163. Id.
164. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 14.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id.
168. Id. Small counties include those with populations of 50,000 or less as of April 1,
1992. Use of the tax money would be subject to conditions. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96,
at 18.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 19.
171. Id. at 19-20.
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1 2
two detailed subsections devoted to the definition. 1
Under the proposed definition, "insignificant fiscal impact" depended
on the population of the affected local governments. The general definition
provided that if a mandate affected either counties or municipalities,
"insignificant fiscal impact" would respectively equal the product of five
cents and the total statewide population or statewide municipal population." 3 If a mandate affected both counties and cities, "insignificant fiscal
impact" would be tied to the total of the statewide municipal population and
the statewide population. 74 However, under additional provisions of the
proposed legislation, the "insignificant fiscal impact" threshold would
apparently decrease if the mandate targeted less populated cities and
counties."' Under this population adjustment formula, the "insignificant

172. Section (2) of the proposed legislation is the relevant provision. It provided:
Section 2..(1) As used in subsection (d) of section 18 of Article VII of the
Florida Constitution, "insignificant fiscal impact" means an amount less than:
(a) The product of multiplying by 5 cents the total statewide municipal
population, for mandates affecting only municipalities;
(b) The product of multiplying by 5 cents the total statewide population,
for mandates affecting only counties; or
(c) The sum of the amounts derived under paragraphs (a) and (b), for
mandates affecting municipalities and counties.
(2) Adjustments to insignificant fiscal impact shall be made as follows:
(a) If a mandate affecting only municipalities applies solely to municipalities that have a combined total population of less than 50 percent of the total
statewidenunicipal population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less
than the product of multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations of the
affected municipalities.
(b) If a mandate affecting only counties applies solely to counties that
have a combined total population of less than 50 percent of the total statewide
population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less than the product of
multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations in the affected counties.
(c) If a mandate affecting counties and municipalities applies solely to
counties and municipalities that have a combined total population of less than
50 percent of the sum of the total statewide municipal population and the total
statewide population, insignificant fiscal impact means an amount less than the
product of multiplying by 10 cents the sum of the populations in the affected
municipalities and in the affected counties.
(3) For the purposes of this section, "population" means the latest
population estimates determined by the Demographic Estimating Conference
pursuant to s. 216.136, Florida Statutes, for the applicable state fiscal year.
id. at 20.
173. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 19-20.
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id.
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fiscal impact" exemption would be harder to meet where the affected local
governments were sparsely populated, since the dollar amount threshold
would be tied to their population, rather than to the population on a statewide basis. In any event, the general formula is notable since it used a five
cent multiple rather than the Legislature's ten cent figure. This adjustable
exemption was likely the result of lobbying by local government representatives, since its effect would have been to remove the "insignificant fiscal
impact" exemption in certain instances. As previously mentioned, this
proposed legislation was not enacted.

VIII. THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Mandate Legislation
In 1993, mandate legislation reached a post-amendment high. Fortyfive laws were enacted that contained a total of eighty mandate provisions. 76 As were the majority of the 1992 mandates, most of the 1993
mandate provisions were classified as either exempt or excepted under the
amendment's language.
Sixteen of the exempt mandates were determined to have insignificant
fiscal impact, among them a law requiring local governments to provide
death benefits to local fire fighters, and another law creating a new program
requiring the appointment of interpreters for deaf jurors."' Other mandates, classified as laws that would reduce the tax base, were also found to
have an insignificant fiscal impact. One such law extends the government
leasehold exemption to airport properties. Another expands homestead
exemptions
for spouses of deceased disabled veterans and spouses with life
78
estates.'
Criminal law and federal mandate exemptions were also enacted. A
law dealing with prostitution and HIV transmission was determined to be
exempt under the amendment's criminal law provisions. It requires
mandatory HIV testing for defendants charged with certain crimes. Counties
would incur the cost of the testing while the defendants are in their

176.

FLORIDA ADVISORY

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1993
Draft Edition, Aug. 1993, at 5. [hereinafter 1993

COUNCIL ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMPACT REPORT,
REPORT].

177. Id. at 6, 7.
178. Id. at 9, 10.
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custody. 79 Another law, seeking to implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act in the area of public transportation, was found to be exempt
since it was passed in compliance with federal law. 80
The 1993 legislation also included a number of laws that were
determined to be excepted under the amendment. For example, one law
increased the pension subsidy paid by local government employers by $4
million. Another law requires state and local governments to spend funds
to collect and segregate certain types of batteries. Both of these laws were
found to fulfill important state interests and applied to similarly situated
persons.'
One law was found to fulfill an important state interest and
was funded. It provides that local government involved in emergency
management
plans must develop their plans consistent with the state's
182
plan.
ACIR included a number of laws in its 1993 report that the legislative
staff failed to identify as mandates. Some of these appear to require the
expenditure of funds. One law, for example, lowers the blood/breath
alcohol level to .08% for DUI's. The Report acknowledges the law will
have an impact on county jails; however, staff determined the law was not
a mandate.' 8 3 Another law reduces the sales tax charged on milk and
juice in vending machines. Again, staff determined that the amendment's
language was not applicable to this law.'" 4
The 1993 Report acknowledges those mandate provisions that lacked
bill analyses to address the mandate problem as well as those mandate
provisions that. were added to laws within House and Senate chambers.'85
As to the former, the Report states that either an exemption or exception to
the constitution's mandate provisions "may apply, but it is not documented
in the Constitutional Restriction or Fiscal Impact sections of the staff
analyses.' 86
The 1993 legislative activity shows no decrease in mandate activity; if
anything, it demonstrates, much as the 1992 legislation, the widespread
reliance on exemptions and exceptions to enact mandates.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 5.
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B. Implementing Legislation
There were no attempts to enact implementing legislation during the
1993 legislative session.

IX. LocAL GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT
Since there have been virtually no cases construing section 18,187 we
are left to consider local government's critique of legislative activity in the
wake of the amendment. Close observers of the post-amendment legislative
activity raise questions about the effectiveness of the provision in light of
the Legislature's interpretation of section 18's language. That interpretation
will be very persuasive in the event of later challenges.188
Depending on which level of government is offering an opinion, differing views of the amendment emerge. Generally speaking, the Florida
League of Cities has been more positive about the effect of the amendment
than has been the Florida Association of Counties.189 However, each
county and municipality in the state is affected differently, depending on its
peculiarities, and accordingly, the views expressed below are not meant to
accurately reflect the views of all of Florida's local governments.
According to the League of Cities, Florida cities are generally "thrilled"
with the passage of section 18.19° The amendment is viewed as a success
because it requires the mandate issue to be faced head-on early in the
legislative process, and forces an awareness on the part of legislators.' 9'
Many freshman legislators arrive in Tallahassee with many good ideas, but
without any thought as to how they will be funded. Put another way,

187. As of the writing of this article, only one case has construed the constitutional
provision. See In re B.C., 610 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that article VII, section 18 operates prospectively).
188. See Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel.Boone, 234 So. 2d 665,669
(Fla. 1970) ("[Wlhere a constitutional provision may well have either of several meanings,
it is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that, if the Legislature has by statute
adopted one, its action in this respect is well-nigh, if not completely, controlling.").
189. The author spoke to representatives of both the League of Cities and Association
of Counties, and uses their views in this article to depict the general views of Florida's cities
and counties, respectively.
190. Tipton, supra note 52.
191. Id.
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govemment will run out of money before it runs out of ideas.192 The
amendment has helped to open the eyes of legislative newcomers.193
While the League of Cities is generally optimistic about the amendment
and has pledged to work closely with legislators to deal with individual
mandate issues,"' it does pinpoint a few concerns. One problem stems
from the ease with which the "important state interest" requirement can be
met. It appears that a legislator merely has to say that a bill fulfills such an
interest and the hurdle is met."' Once that simple step is taken, a mandate will qualify for an exception under section 18 if any of subsection (a)'s
exceptions are met.196 Viewed in this manner, the exceptions to the
mandate restriction are really nothing more than additional exemptions.
A second concern raised by the League of Cities is the lack of
legislation that defines "insignificant fiscal impact." The Legislature's
current use of $1.4 million197 as the threshold below which an insignificant
fiscal impact will be found is somewhat arbitrary and leads to an easier
finding of an. exemption. However, there may be some benefit. in not
having the term defined by way of implementing legislation, since it could
give a challenging local government more leeway to argue that a mandate
under this guideline is, in fact, significant.198 Whether there is implementing legislation or not, the League's position is that the state would have to
shoulder the burden of demonstrating than any mandate has an insignificant
fiscal impact or is otherwise exempt or excepted from section 18's
reach. 199
Florida's Association of Counties gives section 18 a less favorable
review. This is due, in part, to a feeling that county services are more
broad-based than those of cities, which in turn makes counties more
susceptible to mandate legislation."
As are the cities, counties are

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. For example, the League has used ACIR's FAXNET. See supratext accompanying
note 103-05.
195. Tipton, supra note 52.
196. These include funding of the enactment, authorizing a funding source, approving

the law by a two-thirds vote; finding that the law applies to all persons similarly situated; or
finding that the law is required to comply with a federal mandate.
197. This figure is based on a Florida population of 14 million applied to a ten cents per
capita formula.
198. Tipton, supra note 52.
199. Id.
200. Telephone Interview with Alma Gonzalez-Neimeiser, Legislative Director, Florida
Association of Counties (May 26, 1993).
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dissatisfied with section 18's exemptions, particularly the criminal law and
"insignificant fiscal impact" exemptions.
Criminal laws are not defined in the amendment, and counties would
be pleased if the term was defined to encompass only those laws creating
criminal liability and fixing punishment. Due to the silence of the
amendment and the absence of any implementing legislation, counties point
out that a law requiring local government expenditures for prisons could be
exempt.201 This fear is not unfounded. The law passed during the 1992
session requiring law enforcement agencies to comply with new administrative requirements in contraband-related seizures was determined by staff to
be exempt as a criminal law. ° Similarly, the 1993 mandatory HIV
testing3 law for certain criminal defendants also passed as an exempt criminal
20
law.
Counties further urge implementing legislation to define "insignificant
fiscal impact." The current use of a $1.4 million threshold before fiscal
significance comes into play does not correspond to the $50,000 figure the
state uses to determine whether a fiscal impact is significant.0 4 Furthermore, under current procedures, legislative staffers are left to determine the
matter themselves, sometimes in situations where reliable figures are not
available.
While the exemptions may be the largest source of the counties'
concern, the procedures for establishing the exceptions under the amendment
also raise questions. As do cities, counties point to the ease with which an
important state interest is determined. Often the language is merely inserted
in a bill with little, if any, debate or discussion.2 5 The 1992 law allowing
the inclusion of incentive pay in police retirement benefits, as well as the
law aimed at achieving "potty parity," were both determined to fulfill
important state interests.20 6 Arguably, anything the Legislature does is

201. Id. It is likely, however, that such a law could also qualify as an exception if it
applied to all counties under the "all persons similarly situated" exception.

202. 1992
203. 1993

REPORT,
REPORT,

supra note 96, at 8.
supra note 176, at 9.

204. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supranote 200. The Revenue Estimating Conference, created
by Florida Statutes section 216.053, uses the $50,000 figure to determine fiscal significance.
See FLA. STAT. § 216.053 (1991); see also Governor's Veto Messageof SB 2000, reprinted
in 2 FLA. S. JOUR. 10 (Spec. Sess. C 1991).
205. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
206. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8. Unfortunately, the Report fails to articulate
exactly what important state interests are involved.
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important to the state.20 7 The 1993 law increasing local government
pension subsidies and regulating battery collection also passed under this
provision."'
Counties also point to a more subtle problem. If the important state
interest determination is made, a law will be excepted from the amendment's prohibition if '"the expenditure is required to comply with a law that
applies to all persons similarly situated, including the state and local
governments . ,o9"0. This exception has been relied upon by legislative
staff and is becoming more of a concern to counties.210 Because of the
language which appears to treat local governments as "persons" for the
purposes of the exception, a law could be deemed to fall within the
exception if itequally affects all counties. Counties see this as a less
conspicuous way to bypass the amendment's provisions.2" For example,
the "potty parity" law passed under this exception.2" 2
A further claim made by the counties is that the two-thirds majority
vote exception is not difficult to meet, since a two-thirds vote, even of the
full membership, is not uncommon for many laws. This appears to be true.
By way of example, of those general bills originated in the Senate during
the Regular Session of the 1992 Legislature, 138 were passed by both
houses. Of those bills, only twelve, or just less than ten percent, failed to
meet the two-thirds membership vote.213 Counties would prefer to see a
three-fourths majority vote in its place.2" 4
Even though counties appear less optimistic about the impact of section
18, they are not without any favorable response. The amendment is
perceived as helping counties maintain revenues, particularly state-shared
funds such as those generated by the sales tax.25 Since any attempt by

207. The subjects determined to fulfill important state interests for the purposes of
section 18's exceptions contrast sharply with those deemed by the courts to serve an
important state interest in other constitutional law contexts. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v.
Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (preservation of life); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408
So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1981) (promoting the disclosure of campaign contributors); Kendrick v.
Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1980) (protecting the welfare of children).
208. 1993 REPORT, supra note 176, at 8.
209. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18 (emphasis added).
210. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
211. Id.
212. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8.
213. LEGISLATIVE INF. Div., JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMM,, FLA. LEGIS.,
FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION 5, 22-194 (1992).
214. Gonzales-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
215. Id.
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the Legislature to redistribute revenue sharing to the detriment of local
governments would bring section 18 into play, the Legislature has had to
look for other ways to improve the state's fiscal condition.216 The result
has been more of a hands-off attitude toward local governments' existing
funding. In fact, recent sessions have attempted to help local governments
by passing laws authorizing more flexibility in collecting revenues at the
local government level. 1 '
Counties do agree that the amendment institutionalizes the mandate
issue and forces the Legislature to confront it early on. While the political
realities of trade-offs between local governments and the Legislature
continue, the mandate provision seems to work more to the advantage of
local governments, who were forced to work with less leverage before the
amendment's passage. In that respect, the amendment has had significant
impact."'
Despite the limited favorable views of Florida's counties and cities, any
individual local government may be more or less pleased with the amendment, depending on that locality's particular circumstances. For example,
in spite of the promise of section 18, the city of Fort Lauderdale has been
losing money because its permanent population is decreasing. Since its
share of state sales tax revenues depends on the population base,21 9 Fort
Lauderdale's share has decreased in recent years. Section 18 does not
prevent that type of revenue loss. 2 To a certain extent, Fort Lauderdale
does not see the amendment as necessarily helping it maintain its existing
level of funding. In fact, Fort Lauderdale is further concerned that the
amendment does not prevent the Legislature from separating large ticket
items into a number of smaller components to enable it to pass a number of
bills under the "insignificant fiscal impact exemption.""' '
Cities such as
Fort Lauderdale also struggle to meet federal mandates and mandates that
pre-date the amendment's passage, which are also not implicated by section

216. Id. Ms. Gonzalez-Neimeiser used the example of a law that repealed certain sales
tax exemptions. The law resulted in more state funds. The legislative alternative would have
been to cut back on local governments' share of sales tax funds. The latter course would
have required compliance with section 18; the legislature opted for the former course of
action. Id.
217. 1992 REPORT, supra note 96, at 8-10.
218. Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
219. See FLA. STAT. § 218 (1991).
220. Telephone Interview with Terry Sharp, Budget Director, City of Fort Lauderdale,
Fla. (June 8, 1993).
221. Id.
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18.2"2 In the face of these difficulties, cities such as Fort Lauderdale are
having to find help beyond section 18 to combat their fiscal problems. 23
It is fair to say that local governments see the amendment as a mixed
blessing. While it has created a legislative awareness of the mandate
problem, the amnendment's provisions nevertheless allow many mandates to
be enacted, and do not help local governments comply with pre-existing
mandates. Local governments are also awaiting almost certain mandates that
would be allowed under the amendment, including federal environmental
mandates and state mandates pertaining to the court system.2 4

X. CONCLUSION
The great expectations harbored by struggling local governments have
not been fully met by article VII, section 18, of the Florida Constitution.
This is at once made apparent by the steady and dramatic increase in
mandate legislation since the amendment's passage. At its worst, this spiral
may indicate a legislative belief that any mandate can be made to fit one of
the constitution's exemptions or exceptions. However, when considered in
light of its articulated purpose-to give local governments greater bargaining
power on the subject of unfunded state mandates and to protect local
revenue sources-section 18 reaches some level of success. Cities and
counties generally agree that the measure has institutionalized, at an early
stage of legislation, the mandate issue, and that it has helped, to a certain
extent, maintain existing funding.
Before the issue loses momentum, local governments should lobby for
implementing legislation to restrict the Legislature's reliance on both the
criminal law and "insignificant fiscal impact" exemptions. 2 5 A limiting
clarification of the "similarly situated persons" exception should also be
considered. Such legislation should also assign venue for future disputes
and should expressly place the burden of demonstrating compliance with the

222. Id. For example, 85% ofFort Lauderdale'swater treatment costs stem from federal
and state mandates that pre-dated section 18.
223. For example, some older cities are finding themselves working with counties to
help maintain funding in the face of population loss to suburban areas. Telephone Interview
with George Hanbury, City Manager of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (June 4, 1993).
224. Tipton, supra note 52; Gonzalez-Neimeiser, supra note 200.
225. Tipton, supra note 52. Generating the legislative interest necessary to enact
implementing legislation may prove difficult. There was no effort to pass implementing
legislation in the 1993 legislative session. There is a feeling that the Legislature may believe
it has provided enough assistance to local governments by originating the amendment. Id.
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amendment on the Legislature. Other ambiguities in the amendment will
likely have to await judicial determination. In the meantime, section 18
leaves Florida's local governments better off than they were prior to its
adoption, but they are not yet where they want to be. To paraphrase the
remarks of one city official, before section 18 was adopted, local governments operated in quicksand; now they have touched bottom, but they are
still waiting for someone to throw them a rope.2" 6

226. Hanbury, supra note 223.
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